A Response to Bloch, Lubbers & (and) Verkuil’s the Social Security Administration’s New Disability Adjudication Rules: A Cause for Optimism… and Concern by Rains, Robert E.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 92
Issue 2 January 2007 Article 3
A Response to Bloch, Lubbers & (and) Verkuil’s the
Social Security Administration’s New Disability
Adjudication Rules: A Cause for Optimism… and
Concern
Robert E. Rains
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert E. Rains, A Response to Bloch, Lubbers & (and) Verkuil’s the Social Security Administration’s New Disability Adjudication Rules: A
Cause for Optimism… and Concern, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 249 (2007)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol92/iss2/3
A RESPONSE TO BLOCH, LUBBERS & VERKUIL'S
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S




Professors Bloch, Lubbers, and Verkuil have performed a yeo-
men's service in advising the Commissioner of the Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA) on reforming the process for administrative
decision making and appeals.1 In a well-balanced article for this Sym-
posium, the professors generally praise the Commissioner's new Disa-
bility Service Improvement (DSI) process, which SSA will phase in
starting with claims filed on or after August 1, 2006, in SSA Region 1.2
The professors also note their disagreements with and reservations re-
garding certain aspects of the DSI plan.
I wish I were as optimistic as Professors Bloch, Lubbers, and
Verkuil as to the expected benefits of the DSI process. Certain aspects
of the new process are undoubtedly beneficial.3 However, if DSI is
ever fully implemented in its current form nationwide, one particular
aspect of the plan-eliminating a claimant's right to seek administra-
tive review of a wholly or partially unfavorable administrative law
judge (ALJ) decision-is cause for great concern.
-t Professor of Law and Director, Disability Law Clinic, Pennsylvania State University
Dickinson School of Law. The author is a member of the Board of Directors of the Na-
tional Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representatives (NOSSCR), but the views
expressed in this Article are his own. The author's professional experiences representing
Social Security claimants since 1979, first in the private practice of law, and, subsequently,
while supervising students in the Dickinson School of Law's Disability Law Clinic, provide
the basis for the anecdotal information included herein.
I See FRANK BLOCH ET AL., INTRODUCING NONADVERSARIAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTA-
TIVES TO IMPROVE THE RECORD FOR DECISION IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATIONS:
A REPORT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD (2003), http://www.ssab.gov/docu-
menLs/Bloch-Lubbers-Verkuil.pdf, PAUL VERKUIL & JEFFERY LUBBERS, ALTERNATIVE AP-
PROACHES TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CASES: A REPORT TO THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD (2002), http://www.ssab.gov/Piblications/Disability/
VerkuilLubbers.pdf.
2 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. 16,424 (Mar. 31, 2006) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416 & 422).
3 See Legislation & Regulations, 30 MENTAL & P-IYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 478, 478
(2006) (noting that DSI is "an effort to improve accuracy, consistency and timeliness of
decision-making throughout the disability determination process").
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I surely agree with Professors Bloch, Lubbers, and Verkuil that
"any effort to reform the disability determination process must target
the prompt development of a full and complete record."4 Indeed,
development of a full and complete record is central to my own article
for this Symposium.
. Eliminating the reconsideration level of administrative decision
making could benefit the disability determination process. Indeed, in
Pennsylvania, the reconsideration step for initial claims has not exis-
ted for several years.5 Given the statistical unlikelihood of a claimant
obtaining a different result on reconsideration than on initial consid-
eration,6 this is generally perceived as eliminating a roadblock to
meaningful appeal rather than as eliminating a valuable avenue to
rectifying incorrect decisions. SSA's statistics for Fiscal Year (FY) 2005
indicate that claimants were successful at the reconsideration stage for
initial claims only 14% of the time.7 On the other hand, reconsidera-
tion has benefited individuals already receiving benefits who were go-
ing through Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs), with a 50%
reversal rate in FY 2005.8 Thus, eliminating the reconsideration step
in CDR cases may result in unnecessary delay for those previously
found to be disabled.9
However, it is hard to see how use of a federal reviewing official
(FedRO) will be a significant improvement over the reconsideration
stage. In practice, claims often are not fairly and adequately devel-
oped by the state agencies at the initial determination stage.10 While
this situation has improved over the years, in our clinical work, we
4 See Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Paul R. Verkuil, The Social Security Adminis-
tration's New Disability Adjudication Rules: A Significant and Promising Reform, 92 CORNELL L.
REv. 235, 237 (2007).
5 See, e.g., Daniel J. Siegel, Don't Overlook Social Security: Injured Workers Benefit from
Social Security, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 9, 2000, at 5 (noting that "in Pennsylvania and
some other states, an experimental program has eliminated the reconsideration step").
6 See OFFICE OF POLICY & OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION & STATISTICS, Soc. SEC.
ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PRO-
CRAM, 2004, at 129 tbl.55 (2006), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/
2004/di asrO4.pdf (demonstrating low allowance rates for medical decisions at the recon-
sideration level between 1992 and 2003).
7 See, e.g., Disability Determinations and Appeals Fiscal Year 2005, Soc. SECURITY F. (Nat'l
Org. of Soc. Sec. Claimants' Representatives, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.), Mar. 2006, at 55.
8 See id.
9 The regulatory scheme is unclear as to if and when the DSI process will apply to
CDRs. On one hand, the Commissioner declares in a Supplementary Information section
in the Federal Register that "[t]he new process will apply to claims for DI benefits and for
SSI payments based on disability or blindness." Administrative Review Process for Adjudi-
cating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,424, 16,427 (Mar. 31, 2006) (to be codified
at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416 & 422). On the other hand, the actual DSI regulations state
that "the terms 'disability claim' or 'claim' do not include a continuing disability review or
age-18 redetermination." 20 C.F.R. § 405.5 (2006).
10 See Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of SylvesterJ. Schieber, Member, Social Security Advisory
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continue to see denials at the initial level that are due to incomplete
records and residual functional capacity forms filled out by state
agency reviewing physicians and psychologists that bear little or no
relationship to the evidence provided by treating and consulting med-
ical and psychological examiners. Similarly, at the ALJ level, we see
that the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review (ODAR) (for-
merly the Office of Hearings and Appeals) continues to lack the re-
sources to carefully review claimants' medical records and ensure
their completion. Rather than add the FedRO, SSA should put more
resources into the initial determination process and the ODAR in or-
der to encourage full and timely development of the record at these
two critical stages.
There is, however, one aspect of the DSI that should work as an
unalloyed blessing for claimants, representatives, and ALJs alike.
Under current rules, the ALJ or the hearings office staff must send
notice of a hearing to the claimant and representative only twenty
days prior to the scheduled hearing."1 As a result, representatives face
a dilemma: If they request records and reports from ongoing treat-
ment sources shortly after they are retained, at a time when the hear-
ing is not yet scheduled and likely will not be for several more months,
the representatives will have to duplicate their efforts and expenses
when the hearing is finally scheduled. If, on the other hand, they wait
until after the hearing is scheduled to get records and reports, they
run the very real risk that they will get the records and reports just
before or even after the hearing date. It is understandably frustrating
for ALJs to receive a pile of medical information shortly before, dur-
ing, or after a hearing. This minimal notice requirement also leads to
legal battles over "closing the record."
The new DSI rule requires that ALJs provide notice to the claim-
ant or representative at least seventy-five days prior to a hearing unless
the claimant or representative agrees otherwise.' 2 The DSI also in-
cludes a general requirement that written evidence be submitted no
fewer than five business days before the date of the scheduled hear-
ing. 13 With seventy-five days' notice, representatives who have previ-
ously been retained will normally be able to provide medical
Board) (stating that one major problem for the Social Security hearings office is inade-
quately developed appeals).
11 See OFFICE OF DISABILIrY ADJUDICATION & REVIEW, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., HALLEX:
HEARINGS, APPEALS AND LITIGATION LAW MANUAL § 1-2-3-15 (2005), http://www.ssa.gov/
OP_Home/hallex/ ("The ALJ or the [hearings office] staff must send notice of the hear-
ing to the claimant and representative at least 20 days before the hearing.").
12 20 C.F.R. § 405.315 (2006).
13 Id. § 405.331.
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information to the ALJs in a timely fashion.' 4 This should be a win-
win situation, and these parts of the new rules should be implemented
nationwide immediately.
Professors Bloch, Lubbers, and Verkuil are correct to question
how the new Disability Review Board (DRB) will adequately carry out
the Appeals Council's review function. 15 Despite concerns voiced in
many comments on the proposed rules, 16 the Commissioner has in-
sisted on eliminating a claimant's right to administratively appeal an
ALJ denial on the merits. 17 The reasoning behind the Commis-
sioner's decision is obscure at best. The explanation provided in the
final rule-that the DRB will be phased in graduallyl 8-is unenlight-
ening. One possible rationale for eliminating this valuable right is the
paternalistic, "Big Brother" rationale that SSA knows better than the
aggrieved claimants themselves who has been wrongfully denied bene-
fits. Another rationale, which is crassly economic, is that the Commis-
sioner, knowing that many aggrieved claimants will lack the resources
and stamina to appeal to federal court, wishes to save the government
money.19 Finally, despite her protestations to the contrary, the Com-
missioner may have a hidden agenda rationale for her actions in that
she may wish to have the federal district courts flooded with Social
Security appeals in order to lay the groundwork for advocating the
removal of these cases from the Article III federal district courts and
the setting up of an Article I Social Security Court in their stead.
Under this rationale, since SSA will become more arbitrary by denying
numerous claimants an administrative appeal from unfavorable ALJ
decisions, the government must also deny those aggrieved claimants
judicial review by generalist Article III federal district court judges.
20
14 There will always be situations in which representatives are retained shortly before
a scheduled hearing, claimants get treatment shortly before a hearing, a medical source is
recalcitrant about producing requested records, or older medical records are simply diffi-
cult-or impossible-to obtain.
15 See Soc. Sec. Admin., Social Security's Appeals Council Review Process, http://
www.ssa.gov/appeals/appeals.process.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) (explaining the Ap-
peals Council's function).
16 See Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. 16,424, 16,438-40 (Mar. 31, 2006) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416 &
422).
17 See id. (providing the Commissioner's responses to comments received regarding
the proposal to establish the DRB).
18 See id. at 16,438.
19 See Michael Abramowitz, President Remains Eager to Cut Entitlement Spending, WASH.
POST, Aug. 11, 2006, at A7 (discussing the Bush Administration's pledge to reduce spend-
ing on Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security following the November midterm
elections).
20 One Social Security ALJ is already using the new DSI regulations as a basis for
advocating the elimination of Article III judicial review. In a statement to the 2006 Sum-
mer Council Meeting of the ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice,
ALJ Robin J. Arzt argued:
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In the March 31, 2006 final rulemaking, the Commissioner pur-
ported to be sensitive to the concern that eliminating claimants' right
to administrative review of ALJ denials would flood the federal courts:
Many commentators, including the Administrative Office of United
States Courts, thought that the shift of the Appeals Council's func-
tions to the DRB would have an adverse effect on the Federal court
system and would result in an increase in the number of cases ap-
pealed to the Federal courts. To address these concerns, we plan a
gradual rollout to minimize the impact on the judiciary. We plan to
begin implementation of the new process in the Boston region,
which is one of our smallest regions.
21
But the very next sentence makes clear that this "rollout" in Region I
cannot possibly demonstrate what in fact will happen when claimant-
initiated administrative review is eliminated: "Because we are begin-
ning in a small region, we will be able to have the DRB initially review
all or most of the administrative law judge decisions that are issued in
the Boston region."
22
In her June 15, 2006 statement to the Subcommittee on Social
Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means, the Commis-
sioner expanded on her declaration that the DRB will initially review
"all or most" ALJ decisions in Region I:
[W]e have decided that the DRB will initially review all of the ad-
ministrative lawjudge decisions-allowances and denials-issued in
the Boston region. This 100 percent review will allow us carefully to
design, test, and validate a predictive model for selecting a subset of
all ALJ decisions for DRB review that include those most likely to be
remanded by the U.S. District Courts. During this same period, we
will analyze the effects of the new approach on the workload of the
Federal courts within the region.
23
However, the rollout in Region I will not show the actual conse-
quences of denying aggrieved claimants the right to seek review by the
DRB. First, the new process will only apply to claims filed on or after
August 1, 2006. Second, the Commissioner pledges to wait only one
Since the SSA is about to phase out having a specialized administrative tri-
bunal to which a Social Security disability benefits claimant can appeal an
ALJ's decision, this is yet another factor that supports creating a specialized
court to handle the expected increased caseload in the stead of the district
courts.
Robin J. Arzt, Proposal for a United States Social Security Court 6 (2006) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/annual2006/Tab8Bproposal.pdf.
21 Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 16,439.
22 Id.
23 Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,




year after full implementation in Region I to assess the impact of the
changes, making it unclear how many, if any, cases will have
progressed through the DRB level. Third, and most importantly, dur-
ing this phase-in period, the DRB will review all denials of benefits.
Since the concern is that the federal courts will be flooded with cases
not reviewed by the DRB, a rollout in which all ALJ decisions are re-
viewed by the DRB will not test the impact of the final regulations on
the federal docket.
If eliminating administrative appeal of ALJ denials does insulate
from administrative review a significant number of legally unsupport-
able ALJ decisions, the proper response is for SSA to modify the DSI
plan to allow claimants to appeal to the DRB, not to truncate their
right to judicial review when it is most needed. In their article, Profes-
sors Bloch, Lubbers, and Verkuil note that Professors Lubbers and
Verkuil have elsewhere "recommended renewed consideration of an
Article I Social Security Court to deal with Article III court caseload
concerns." 24 However, if the operations of the DRB do result in large
numbers of unsupportable ALJ denials escaping administrative review,
in fact, that would be the exact situation in which claimants would
most need redress to a strong and independent Article III judiciary
(not a lesser court housed within the executive branch) to ensure ap-
propriate relief until SSA corrects its course of conduct.
The Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities has addressed this
issue:
The Commissioner's proposal does not make any recommendations
regarding creation of a Social Security Court. However, other stake-
holders, in their recent responses to the Commissioner's proposal,
recommend creation of such a court.
We support the current system of judicial review and strongly
oppose creation of a Social Security Court. Proposals to create ei-
ther a Social Security Court to replace the federal district courts or a
Social Security Court of Appeals to provide for consideration of ap-
peals of all Social Security cases from district courts have been con-
sidered, and rejected, by Congress and SSA over the past twenty
years.
We believe that both individual claimants and the system as a
whole benefit from the federal courts deciding Social Security cases.
Over the years, the federal courts have played a critical role in pro-
tecting the rights of claimants. The system is well-served by regular,
and not specialized, federal judges who hear a wide variety of fed-
eral cases and have a broad background against which to measure
the reasonableness of SSA's practices.
25
24 See Bloch, Lubbers & Verkuil, supra note 4, at 239 n.24.
25 CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES, POSITION PAPER ON THE COMMIS-
SIONER'S PROPOSAL TO CHANGE THE DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESS 17 (May 2004), available at
254 [Vol. 92:249
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In the early 1980s, when SSA undertook a draconian purge of the
disability rolls and thereby caused massive hardship for hundreds of
thousands of disabled Americans, it was the federal judiciary-along
with many ALJs-who compelled SSA to comply with settled law.
26
One hopes that SSA's intended elimination of claimant-initiated ad-
ministrative review of ALJ decisions will not have similar results. If it
does, however, SSA must take corrective action and must not seek to
insulate itself from the judicial censure it would deserve.
http://www.aapd-dc.org/policies/ccdclaimprocess.html (statement on behalf of the Amer-
ican Association of Mental Retardation, American Association of People with Disabilities,
American Foundation for the Blind, American Network of Community Options & Re-
sources, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Brain Injury Association of America,
Council for Exceptional Children, Helen Keller National Center, International Association
of Psychosocial Rehabilitation Services, National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, National As-
sociation of Protection & Advocacy Systems, National Coalition on Deaf-Blindness, Na-
tional Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, National Mental Health Association,
National Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representatives, National Rehabilita-
tion Association, NISH, Paralyzed Veterans of America, Spina Bifida Association of
America, The Arc of the United States, United Cerebral Palsy, United Spinal Association,
and the World Institute on Disability).
26 See, e.g., Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security? A Critique of Recent
Proposals, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1987).
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